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Westin v. McDaniel: An Interesting Twist
on Younger Abstention
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Westin v. McDaniel,1 the District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Georgia
from prosecuting a criminal defense attorney for hindering an undercover
police officer.2 Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that the traditional notions of federalism and comity, which normally preclude a federal court from intervening in state criminal proceedings, were inapplicable because no state
case was pending against the attorney when the federal action was
brought. He further ruled that even if those principles were applicable,
federal intervention was still appropriate because the prosecuting attorney acted in "bad faith" in seeking an indictment.4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling without comment.
This Casenote first examines the principles of abstention espoused in
Younger v. HarrisO and refined in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Next, it provides the facts and procedural history of Westin v. McDaniel
followed by a detailed examination of the court's opinion. The Casenote
concludes with an analysis of the decision and a brief summary.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Generally, federal courts do not interfere in state affairs absent extraordinary circumstances.7 The underlying rationale for this policy of
noninterference is federalism-a fundamental doctrine whereby power is
shared between the federal and state governments and by which the federal government endeavors to protect federal rights and interests in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the states.'
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

760 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 1564.
Id. at 1568.
Id. at 1575.
Westin v. McDaniel, 949 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1991).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
760 F. Supp. at 1566.
Id.
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In Younger v. Harris,the United States Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental tenet of federalism that, subject to a few carefully carved
out exceptions, federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal
proceedings.' In Younger the Supreme Court reversed a district court's
granting of an injunction against the enforcement of a California criminal
statute which was unconstitutional on its face. 10 The Court identified the
following primary sources of this policy of federalism and noninterference: (1) the basic doctrine that courts of equity should not enjoin criminal prosecutions when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law
and will not suffer irreparable harm; (2) to prevent erosion of the role of
the jury; (3) to avoid duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions
where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted; and
(4) the notion of "comity," a recognition that the United States is a union
of sovereign states which functions best if the states are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways."
Based on these considerations of equity, comity, and federalism, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the normal thing to do when
federal courts are asked to enjoin pending [state] proceedings . . . is not
to issue such injunctions."12 The only exception to this absolute prohibition occurs when intervention is "'absolutely necessary for protection of
constitutional rights . . . [and] where the danger of irreparable loss is
both great and immediate.' "1s This requirement of irreparable harm,
however, is not satisfied by the mere "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution."'1 Rather, in order
to be irreparable, "the threat to the plaintiffs federally protected rights
must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution.'" Because the plaintiff in Younger failed to show
that his prosecution was brought in bad faith or that it was only one of a
series of repeated prosecutions to which he would be subjected, he was
not entitled to an injunction." Moreover, the Court held that "the possible unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face' does not in itself justify
an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that [the
plaintiff]. . . failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief."1
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

401 U.S. at 43.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45.
Id. (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926)).
Id.. at 46.

15. Id.
16.
17.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 54.
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Therefore, in order for a party seeking federal enjoinment of a state
criminal proceeding to overcome the Younger principle of abstention, he
must demonstrate bad faith enforcement of a state law, harassment, or
other special circumstances.1" However, the Supreme Court in Younger
did not address whether federal courts can intervene when there is no
prosecution "pending" in state court at the time the federal proceeding is
begun."' Subsequent cases addressed this issue.
In Steffel v. Thompson,20 the Supreme Court addressed whether or not
declaratory relief is appropriate when a state prosecution is threatened,
but is not pending, and a showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances is not made.21 In Steffel the petitioner was threatened
by the police with arrest for violating a Georgia criminal trespass law if
he did not stop distributing information against America's involvement in
Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of a shopping center." The petitioner
brought an action for declaratory relief in federal court, claiming that the
Georgia trespass law, as applied to him, would violate his federal rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." In reversing the lower
courts' denial of relief, the Court held that federal declaratory relief is not
precluded if there is a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state
criminal statute (even if there is no "pending" state prosecution).2 " Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, further stated:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal*justice system; nor can
federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting
negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional
principles.'"

Thus, Steffel made it clear that federal courts can intervene when state
prosecution is threatened, but not pending, and the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief. The question of injunctive relief, however, had yet to be
addressed.
In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court affirmed the granting
of a preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no pending state
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
401 U.S. at 41.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 462.
422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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prosecution against the plaintiffs. 7 In Doran the plaintiffs operated topless bars in North Hampstead, New York. The town enacted an ordinance
making it unlawful for bar owners and others to permit topless dancing.
The plaintiffs complied with the ordinance (requiring their employees to
wear bikini tops) but brought an action in the district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief.26
Recognizing that injunctive relief of future (not pending) criminal proceedings was a case of first impression, the Court held that the issuance
of a preliminary injunction is not subject to Younger abstention when
there is no pending state prosecution against those seeking relief and the
equitable requirements for an injunction are met." Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, noted that district courts can generally protect
federal interests by granting declaratory relief, but in some situations injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent substantial irreparable harm."0
In explaining the Court's rationale, Rehnquist said, "[nleither declaratory
nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute."' Thus, the void created by the Younger decision with respect to
injunctive relief was apparently filled.
The principle was carried a step further in Wooley v. Maynard"'when
the Court affirmed the granting of a permanent injunction against the
prosecution of the plaintiffs under an unconstitutional statute after the
state had repeatedly convicted them for the same violation.3 3 The Court
summarized as follows the holdings which delineated the scope of
Younger abstention:
In Younger the Court recognized that principles of judicial economy, as
well as proper state-federal relations, preclude federal courts from exercising equitable jurisdiction to enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. However, when a genuine threat of prosecution exists, a litigant is entitled to
resort to a federal forum to seek redress for an alleged deprivation of
federal rights.3 '
27.

d. at 934. There were actually three plaintiffs in Doran-one who was subject to a

pending prosecution and two who were not. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's granting of an injunction with regard to the plaintiff against whom the prosecution
was pending, holding that Younger was applicable to bar such relief. Id. at 922.
28. d. at 924-25.
29. Id. at 930.
30. Id. at 931.
31. Id.

32. 430 U.S. 705.(1977).
33. Id. at 717.
34. Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
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However, the prosecution does not necessarily have to be pending at
the time the federal action is filed. One of the more sweeping constructions of Younger took place in Miranda,-" in which theater owners filed
suit in federal court seeking an injunction for the return of seized copies
of an obscene film and against enforcement of the state obscenity statute. 6 After the federal suit was filed, the theater owners were added as
parties defendant in the state criminal proceeding. 7 The Supreme Court
held that "where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal
plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of
substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force."'
Consequently, as dictated by these decisions, a federal plaintiff who is
faced with a threatened, but not pending, state criminal prosecution may
obtain preliminary or permanent injunctive relief from a federal court if
declaratory relief is not sufficient and he can meet the equitable requirements for such relief.8' Accordingly, when an individual seeks declaratory
or injunctive relief in federal court the question of whether or not a criminal case is pending in state court before a proceeding of substance on the
merits takes place in federal court becomes crucial.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In Wilkinson County, Georgia, Doug Sanders and Alana Fuller, in
hopes of receiving lenient treatment on their own pending drug charges,
acted as confidential informants for Robin McDaniel, an agent of the
Ocmulgee Drug Task Force. On one occasion, they.informed a third party
that he was the subject of McDaniel's investigation. Consequently, McDaniel had them arrested on additional drug charges. After the arrest,
Sanders and Fuller
agreed to continue to act in their capacity as McDan40
iel's informants.

Upon their release, Sanders and Fuller changed their minds. On February 6, 1991, they contacted Robert Westin, an attorney in Wilkinson
County, and requested that he represent them in the matter. In addition
to having a substantial criminal law practice, Westin served as a Judge of
the Recorder's Court in Gordon, Georgia and city attorney for the town of
McIntyre, Georgia."'
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

422 U.S. 332 (1975).
Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 349.
Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 1564.
Id.
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Sanders and Fuller informed Westin that McDaniel was working undercover at a local bar using the name "Natasha Childers." Sanders attempted to contact McDaniel through her beeper to inform her but was
unsuccessful in reaching McDaniel. Westin then called the bar, learned
that "Natasha" was there and proceeded to the bar to speak with her.
Upon entering the bar, Westin saw McDaniel seated at the bar speaking
with the bartender. He approached her and said, "Hi, Robin." When McDaniel told him that her name was Natasha, Westin corrected himself.
He then identified himself as an attorney and McDaniel requested that
they go upstairs to continue their conversation.'"
Upstairs and away from the others in the bar, Westin informed McDaniel that Sanders and Fuller no longer wished to work for her, that he
represented them, and that in the future any communications between
McDaniel and his clients would have to go through him. Westin then
tried to learn more about the charges facing his clients and the two discussed the drug problem in Gordon generally. McDaniel expressed her
fear that Sanders and Fuller had blown her cover already, but Westin
assured her that he had told his clients to say nothing about the case.
3
Westin then departed.'

Noting that others in the bar were acting strangely towards her and
fearing that Westin had blown her cover, McDaniel left the bar and informed Robert Williams, head of the Ocmulgee Drug Task Force, of what
had happened. Williams contacted Joseph Briley, District Attorney for
the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit, and informed him of the circumstances.
After the conversation, Briley considered the matter for a few moments,
and then called back and directed McDaniel to swear out a warrant for
Westin's arrest on charges of hindering a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. 4 McDaniel did not know whether the charge
should be listed as a felony or misdemeanor, so the magistrate issued a
42.
43.

Id.
Id.

44.

O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, a person
who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in
the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(b) Whoever, knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer, prison guard, correctional officer, probation supervisor, parole
supervisor, or conservation ranger in the lawful discharge of his official duties by
offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person
is guilty of a felony and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than one or more than five years.
O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 (1988).
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felony warrant, depending on another judge to downgrade the charge
later in the proceedings if he was mistaken.5
The next day Westin was arrested at his office. Several other persons
charged with drug offenses were arrested at the same time so both newspaper and television reporters were present at Westin's booking. Both
McDaniel and Williams gave interviews to the reporters, and in one of
Williams' interviews he mentioned that disbarment was a possibility for
Westin."'
Westin was then transported to Baldwin County for a bond hearing
before Superior Court Judge John Lee Parrott. Chief Assistant District
Attorney Alberto C. Martinez and Hulane E. George, Westin's counsel,
were already in Judge Parrott's court on other matters. While the judge
and the attorneys conferred, Westin was left handcuffed in a public area
of the Baldwin County courthouse. Bond was eventually granted in the
refrain from practicsum of $10,000 on the condition that Westin would
47
ing criminal law and serving as Recorder's Judge. '
On February 28, 1991, a commitment hearing was held before Senior
Judge James B. O'Connor. On March 1, Judge O'Connor issued an order
dismissing the felony charge against Westin because there was no evidence that he had broken the law "knowingly and willfully" as required
by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(b). The order noted that there was no direct proof
that anyone in the bar had overheard the conversation, although it was a
possibility. The order also stated that Westin's conduct was justified in
the legitimate interests of his client and possibly himself, since there was
also reason to believe that McDaniel regarded Westin himself as a possible target of her investigation."'
After the order was issued, District Attorney Briley decided to continue
to pursue a misdemeanor charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). He reconvened the Wilkinson County grand jury, although he did not need an indictment to prosecute a misdemeanor. The grand jury was scheduled to
meet on March 11, 1991, but that morning Westin filed suit in Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia seeking a temporary restraining order,"4 a preliminary injunction,' permanent injunctive relief,
and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.51 The court entered a re45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

760 F. Supp. at 1565.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED,R. Civ. P. 65(b).

50.

FED.R. Civ. P. 65(a).

51.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdic-
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straining order preventing the grand jury from hearing evidence against
Westin pending the outcome of this preliminary injunction hearing and
the subsequent federal suit.51 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order without comment.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION

Inapplicabilityof Younger v. Harris

A.

Judge Fitzpatrick began
Younger and its underlying
cause there was no criminal
rior Court when the request

his analysis with the basic premise that
concern of federalism were inapplicable beprosecution pending in the Ocmulgee Supefor federal intervention was brought.8 4

When Judge O'Connor issued his order dismissing the charges against
Westin ... [w]hatever case District Attorney Briley had was killed. His
decision to seek an indictment from a reconvened grand jury on the misdemeanor charges (an apparently permissible, but suspicious, act) was an
attempt to revive the corpse of a dead case. It makes little sense to say
that there could still be a pending case . . . after a superior court judge,
after an exhaustive hearing. . . found that there was no probable cause
to believe that Westin had violated O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24.
Judge Fitzpatrick placed considerable emphasis on the fact that to hold
otherwise would allow the District Attorney to do nothing immediately
and continue to list the action as pending until the expiration of the statute of limitations." He then noted that a case would not have become
pending against Westin until the grand jury returned an indictment, as87
suming it would have done so.
. Judge Fitzpatrick dealt next with the holding of Hicks v. Miranda that
even if there is no case pending when the federal complaint is filed,
Younger abstention still applies and the federal action must be dismissed
if state court proceedings start before any substantial proceedings on the
merits have taken place in federal court." The preliminary injunction
hearing and temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 1991 satistion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit at equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

52. 760 F. Supp. at 1565.
53.

Westin v. McDaniel, 949 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1991).

54. 760 F. Supp. at 1567.
55.

Id. at 1567-68.

56. Id. at 1568.
57. Id.
58. 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
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fied this requirement of "substantial proceedings" in federal court. 9 In a
footnote, Judge Fitzpatrick noted that while his own temporary restraining order was the vehicle which allowed proceedings of substance to
occur at the federal level before the state grand jury could hear evidence
against Westin, that had no effect on the outcome:' 0 "Any concerns about
federal courts using temporary restraining orders to establish and preserve injunctive jurisdiction by interfering in state judicial systems can be
answered by examining the nature of such orders. They are by definition
temporary, extraordinary and require an immediate hearing to protect
the opposing party." 1 Thus, according to Judge Fitzpatrick, since the
state would not have had a case pending until the filing of an indictment,
and a proceeding of substance on the merits had occurred in his court,
Younger's concerns of federalism and comity were not implicated and
Westin was not denied his right to a federal forum."
In support of his finding that Younger was inapplicable, Judge Fitzpatrick cited Dombrowski v. Pfister" and Langley v. Ryder." In Dombrowski, a case decided six years before Younger, the Supreme Court held that
where a state grand jury was not convened and indictments were not ob-

tained until after the federal complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief was filed, no state proceedings were pending within the intendment of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283." Accordingly,
application of the Younger doctrine to similar facts should yield a similar
conclusion."
Such a conclusion did result in Langley. 7 There, plaintiffs who were
charged with offenses against state law allegedly committed on federal
land sought an injunction prohibiting the state from prosecuting. 8 The
court first cited Dombrowski for its conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 did

not apply because state criminal proceedings were not pending at the
time the federal complaint was filed because no bill of information or indictment had been filed in state court." It then held that Younger was
also inapplicable since the state had not commenced any criminal pro59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

760 F. Supp. at 1568.
Id. at 1568 n.3.
Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
760 F. Supp. at 1568 n.3.
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
602 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. La. 1985).
380 'U.S. at 484 n.2.
760 F. Supp, at 1568.
Id.
602 F. Supp. at 337.
Id. at 338-39.
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ceedings at the time of the federal trial (a proceeding of "substance on
the merits" at the federal level).7 0
Based on Langley and Dombrowski, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that "[tihe
implication is that the state's case would not have commenced for
Younger purposes until the filing of a bill of information or indictment."7' 1
For Judge Fitzpatrick then, abstention was inappropriate, and he was
free to consider Westin's request for a preliminary injunction.
B. Equitable Requirements for Injunctive Relief
In the Eleventh Circuit the following four distinct requirements must
be met by the party seeking an injunction before such relief will be
granted: (1) a substantial likelihood that the movant will ultimately prevail on the merits; (2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) proof that the threatened injury
to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party; and (4) a showing that the injunction, if issued,
would not be adverse to the public interest. 7" Judge Fitzpatrick, recognizing that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should
not be granted without good' cause, considered each factor in turn.
A Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits. Judge
Fitzpatrick found that there was a substantial likelihood that Westin
would succeed on his underlying legal claim." This finding was based on
the pleadings, briefs filed by amici curiae, and two hearings, whereby the
plaintiff purportedly established that the defendant acted in bad faith
74
and with a retaliatory motive.

Irreparable Injury. After noting that this-was the single most important factor necessary for an injunction, Judge Fitzpatrick quickly established, based on case law, exactly when irreparable harm exists: "[iln
order to establish the element of irreparable injury, Westin must show
that he has no adequate remedy at law, meaning that the injury must be
actual and imminent, not remote and speculative, and requires a remedy
of more than money damages."" While a legal remedy is normally held to
be inadequate only where damages are clearly difficult to assess and mea70. Id. at 339.
71. 760 F. Supp. at 1568.
72. Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber & Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir.
1983).
73. 760 F. Supp. at 1569.
74. Id. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
75. 760 F. Supp. at 1569 (citing New York News, Inc. v. New York, 745 F. Supp. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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sure,76 monetary losses can rise to the level of irreparable harm if the
party seeking an injunction will be forced out of business without it.7
For Judge Fitzpatrick, the threatened injury to Westin of having to undergo a grand jury investigation despite having a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits at the federal level was immediate and not speculative.78 This opinion was based on the finding that without an injunction, District Attorney Briley would again attempt to take his evidence
before a reconvened grand jury." Judge Fitzpatrick found that both Westin's law practice and reputation had suffered since his arrest.80 Because
Westin's claims of bad faith prosecution and retaliation had merit, a
grand jury investigation would almost certainly ruin Westin's law practice
and money damages would not provide adequate compensation."1
Next, Judge Fitzpatrick refuted the state's argument that Westin
would have an adequate remedy in state court.8 2 He cited Kugler v.
Helfant" for the proposition that while the mere cost and anxiety of having to defend a state prosecution did not constitute irreparable injury, a
federal forum is still appropriate when bad faith and harassment are
shown (like that which Judge Fitzpatrick believed to exist in Westin)."
He then distinguished Blalock v. United States" in which a district court
refused to enjoin allegedly tainted grand jury proceedings because the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a motion to quash
the indictment if one was issued." Blalock was different, and therefore
mandated a different result, because the grand jury investigation there
was already in progress when the federal action was brought, whereas7
Westin sought to block a grand jury investigation before it was begun.'
Balance of the Equities. Judge Fitzpatrick next found that the

granting of a preliminary injunction would cause little or no harm to the
state."8 The threatened injury to Westin's law practice and reputation far
76. Id. (citing Rosenfield v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
77. Id. (citing Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F. Supp. 548 (D.
Utah 1984)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id,
82. Id. at 1569-70.
83, 421 U.S. 117 (1975).
84. Id. at 124-25 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
85. 844 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 1550.
87. 760 F. Supp. at 1570.
88. Id.
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outweighed any potential harm to the state, and therefore the equities
balanced in his favor."
The Public Interest. For Judge Fitzpatrick, the only possible harm
to the public, if any existed at all, was the delay caused by the resolution
of Westin's underlying legal claim."0 If Westin were to ultimately win, on
the other hand, the public interest would be served by the granting of a
preliminary injunction that would prevent unjust retaliation against him
by state officers.91 Thus, Westin met all of the traditional requirements
for relief, and a preliminary injunction was granted."
C. The Presence of a Federalism Problem
In Part B of his opinion, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled, in the alternative,
that even if there was a case pending against Westin as the state argued,
abstention would still be inappropriate because the case was prosecuted
in bad faith.'8 He explained:
"When a state criminal proceeding under a disputed state criminal stat-

ute is pending against a federal plaintiff at the time his federal complaint
is filed, Younger v. Harris ...held .. .that unless bad-faith enforcement or other special circumstances are demonstrated, principles of eq-

uity, comity, and federalism preclude issuance of a federal injunction restraining enforcement of the criminal statute . . .
The requirements of bad faith enforcement of a criminal statute for the
Eleventh Circuit were delineated in Wilson v.Thompson." In Wilson the
state revived misdemeanor charges against two individuals when one of
them filed a civil action against the deputies who had made the arrests;
prior to being revived, the cases had been on the "dead docket."' " The
individuals then filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin
the prosecution, alleging that the criminal action was reinstituted "for the
sole purpose of depriving, attempting to deprive, and otherwise interfer89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id,

92. Id. at 1575.
93. Id. at 1570.
94, Id. at 1570-71 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974) (citation omitted)). This logic applied to injunctive relief, and was also based on the previously discussed
cases.
95. 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979). In Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981.
96. 593 F.2d at 1379.
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ing with the rights of plaintiff. . . to seek redress of her grievances. '" 7
The circuit court noted a direct link between the bad faith exception to
the Younger doctrine and the "likelihood of success on the merits" and
"irreparable injury" requirements necessary for a preliminary injunction.' It first held that "irreparable injury [for injunctive purpose] is sufficiently established if the federal plaintiff demonstrates that the state
prosecution against him was brought in bad faith for the purposes of retaliating for or deterring the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights." Next, it noted that in order to meet the injunctive requirement
of likely success on the merits "the plaintiffs mustshow the likely applicability of the Younger bad faith exception and . . . the likely existence
of a constitutional violation causally related to the result sought to be
enjoined."100 Thus,, bad faith for purposes of overcoming Younger and injunctive relief are integrally related and if such bad faith is established an
injunction is appropriate without a showing of the traditional injunction
requirements.
The court then articulated the following three part test to determine if
bad faith enforcement exists: (1) whether the conduct allegedly retaliated against or sought to be deterred is constitutionally protected; (2)
whether the criminal prosecution was at least partially motivated by a
purpose to retaliate for that constitutionally protected conduct; and (3)
whether the state can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
it would have prosecuted even if the impermissible retaliatory purpose
did not exist. 10 1 A retaliatory motive, the second prong of the test, is not
satisfied if the prosecution was brought "solely in response to" the constitutionally protected conduct; rather, the plaintiff must establish that it
was motivated "by a purpose to retaliate for or deter" such conduct. 0 '
With regard to the third prong of the test, whether the state would have
prosecuted anyway, factors to be considered include whether the prosecution was undertaken with no valid hope of a conviction and the significance of the alleged criminal activity.108 After an analysis of the Wilson
decision and its test for bad faith, Judge Fitzpatrick applied the test to
the Westin facts to determine if Westin had established bad faith and
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1383-84. See also Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 FR2d 943 (5th Cir. 1981).
593 F.2d at 1383-84.
Id. at 1384-85.
Id. at 1387.
Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1387 n.22.
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thus suffered irreparable injury so that the principles underlying Younger
would not be offended by the granting of an injunction.
Constitutionally Protected Conduct. Judge Fitzpatrick cited
Houston v. Hill 0M4 for the proposition that Westin's conduct was constitutionally protected by the First Amendment as free speech.10 5 In Houston
the plaintiff brought an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
after being arrested for violating a city ordinance which made it illegal to
oppose or interrupt an officer in the execution of his duty.'" The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as overbroad, and pointed out
that "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.

10

7

The Court recognized

the exception for "fighting words that 'by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' ""0
In applying these guidelines to Westin's words, Judge Fitzpatrick found
them to be constitutionally protected. He stated: "[ilf the constitution
protects speech which publicly and intentionally hinders or interrupts an
officer, then Westin's identification of McDaniel by her true name, which
has all the markings of an innocent mistake, and the subsequent conversation are certainly protected speech also."' 09 Judge Fitzpatrick recognized that words alone could possibly rise to the level of obstructing an
officer as prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, but did not believe that
Westin's words put McDaniel in any danger or were overheard by anyone
else in the bar, and therefore their utterance inflicted no injury and did
not tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'
In finding Westin's conduct to be constitutionally protected, Judge
Fitzpatrick also noted that Westin was an attorney representing his client, and therefore in exercising his own First Amendment right of free
speech he was attempting to protect his client's Sixth Amendment
rights.1 While Westin's mere status as an attorney did not excuse the
commission of a crime, Judge Fitzpatrick recognized "that the attorney
client relationship is a privileged one in our society, and that the exis-

104. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
105. 760 F. Supp. at 1572.
106. 482 U.S. at 455.
107. Id. at 461.
108, Id. at 461-62 (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (.1974)).
109. 760 F. Supp. at 1572.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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tence of such a relationship requires an attorney to sometimes take affirmative steps to guard the interests of his client.""'
A Retaliatory Prosecution. Relying solely on the facts and no
supporting case law, Judge Fitzpatrick found that the decision to prosecute Westin was motivated, at least in part, by District Attorney Briley's
desire to retaliate for Westin's exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct.""3
First, Judge Fitzpatrick noted that Briley neither attempted to contact
Westin nor made any other type of investigation (even though he purportedly held Westin in high regard) before ordering Westin's arrest."'
Second, the assistant district attorney who had represented the state at
the commitment hearing had admitted at the end of that proceeding that
the charges amounted only to a misdemeanor."' Finally, Judge Fitzpatrick reached the conclusion that the grand jury was recalled solely to hear
the charges against Westin.11 s Although Briley testified that he had cases
other than Westin's to present, he completely dismissed the grand jury
when the district court's temporary restraining order, prohibiting him
from presenting evidence against Westin, was issued.' 17 Briley testified
that he recalled the grand jury to give Westin the benefit of an additional
tribunal on the misdemeanor charge; he apparently felt that Judge
O'Connor's order contained a mistake and reconvened the grand jury
without seeing a transcript of the commitment hearing. ' " However,
Judge Fitzpatrick emphasized that the reconvening of the grand jury
would receive much publicity and would give the state a second chance to
establish probable cause in a more favorable atmosphere.1 1' Based on
these facts, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that Westin had met his burden of
establishing that the decision to prosecute him was made, at least in part,
in retaliation for his encounter with McDaniel.' °
Whether the State Would Have Prosecuted Anyway. Under
the final prong of the Wilson test, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that the State
had failed to carry its burden of proving that it would have prosecuted
112. Id.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 1573.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1573-74.
Id. at 1573.

119. Id. Judge Fitzpatrick pointed out in a footnote that there was an unproven suggestion that Briley recalled the grand jury in an attempt to get a finding of probable cause in
order to insulate himself from a suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Id. at 1573
n.8.
120. Id.
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without the retaliatory motive." 1 In reaching this decision, he considered
the relevant factors espoused in Wilson."'3
First, Judge Fitzpatrick found that the prosecution was undertaken
with no hope for a valid conviction because the state could not prove that
Westin had acted "knowingly and willfully" as required by O.C.G.A. § 1610-24. He noted that while Westin's conduct was not beyond reproach, if
Westin had really desired to expose McDaniel an anonymous phone call
to the bar would have better served that purpose.13 8 Further, there was an
absence of any solid evidence, such as testimony from a patron of the bar,
3
that the conversation exposing McDaniel's true identity was overheard. '
Judge Fitzpatrick refuted the state's argument that because the purpose of the commitment hearing was to determine probable cause to detain, not to prosecute, the state had not put its best case forward, and
therefore the record could not be read as establishing no hope for a valid
conviction." s He noted that the testimony of the witnesses at the commitment hearing, including McDaniel's testimony, was substantially the
same as that presented to the district court.12 6 It was inconceivable to
Judge Fitzpatrick that the same evidence presented to the grand jury
could produce additional facts that would establish the element of intent
that was lacking at the hearing.137 Additionally, contrary to the state's
assertions, he found that a judge at a commitment hearing in Georgia is
emp~owered to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a
defendant is guilty, a finding which authorizes the judge to detain the
2 s Based on these circumstances, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that
accused.U
"the State almost certainly was presenting its best case at the commitment hearing and would have made the same effort before the grand jury,
so that the earlier determination that probable cause was absent
is a good
129
indication that there was no hope for a valid conviction.
With regard to the second factor relevant to whether the state would.
have prosecuted, Judge Fitzpatrick concluded that the insignificance of
the misdemeanor charges could only justify the state's efforts to prosecute
121. Id.
122. Id. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
123. 760 F. Supp. at 1574 n.9.
124. Id. at 1574 & n.10.
125. Id. at 1574.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-23(a) provides: "The duty of a court of inquiry is simply to
determine whether there is sufficient reason to suspect the guilt of the accused and to require him to appear and answer before the court competent to try him. Whenever such
probable cause exists, it is the duty of the court to commit." O.C.G.A. § 17-7-23(a) (1990).
129. 760 F. Supp. at 1574.
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if the retaliatory and deterrent motives were present."" The time and effort expended by high-ranking officials and the fact that a grand jury was
reconvened to hear a misdemeanor charge after a judge specifically found
no probable cause to turn the case over to that body, taken together with
the fact that there was no hope for a valid conviction, led Judge Fitzpatrick to the conclusion that the state would'not have prosecuted absent
the purpose of retaliation. s '
Thus, Judge Fitzpatrick was satisfied that the decision to prosecute
Westin was motivated by bad faith as espoused in Wilson, and even if
there were a case pending against Westin in state court, the Younger doctrine did not preclude injunctive relief. 2 Moreover, since Westin overcame Younger by a showing of bad faith, he would be entitled to injunctive relief even without a showing that the traditional injunction
requirements were satisfied.'"
V.

ANALYSIS

The crux of Judge Fitzpatrick's opinion is centered upon his finding
that there was no case "pending" against Westin in state court at the
time he brought his action for an injunction. Consequently, Younger and
its companion cases were inapplicable, and the district court was not precluded from granting injunctive relief.
It is a well settled tenet of Georgia criminal procedure that "dismissal
of charges [at a commitment hearing] based upon lack of probable cause
does not bar the subsequent indictment and trial of a defendant of the
same charges."18 4 This hiatus between the dismissal of charges and the
return of an indictment by a reconvened grand jury certainly presents a
gray area with regard to whether an action remains "pending" for
Younger purposes. Clearly, as Judge Fitzpatrick found, there was no warrant to present to the grand jury on March 12.' But such a finding is not
necessarily dispositive. Indeed, if the court of inquiry's mere dismissal of
charges unqualifiedly terminates a case, permitting a criminal defendant
to seek refuge in federal court, then Younger's underlying purposes-to
prevent duplicative legal proceedings and disruption of the state criminal
justice system-are circumvented." ' Circumvention of Younger is especially true in a case like Westin where the district attorney reconvened
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1574 n.11. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Callahan v. State, 179 Ga. App. 556, 561, 347 S.E.2d 268, 275 (1986).
760 F. Supp. at 1567-68.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
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the grand jury a mere ten days after the conclusion of the court of inquiry's dismissal of charges. 1 7 To rule that this brief interlude is a decisive break in the chain of events sufficient to permit federal intervention
undermines the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that Younger
and its progeny were designed to protect.
Additionally, the holding of Hicks v. Miranda makes clear that the application of Younger is not merely formalistic, nor does the outcome of
the civil proceeding depend on "a race to the courthouse." 3 8 Even when
state criminal proceedings are commenced after the federal complaint is
filed, Younger principles are still applicable so long as no "proceedings of
substance on the merits" have taken place at the federal level.13' Judge
Fitzpatrick's ruling that his own temporary restraining order was such a
proceeding of substance on the merits so as to overcome Younger is a
misapplication of Hicks.4 0 The restraining order was issued after an ex
parte conference on the very day the grand jury was about to hear evidence on the matter."" Surely the Supreme Court did not intend for
Younger and its underlying, fundamental notions of comity and federalism to be so easily overcome. Indeed, Hicks seemingly mandates the opposite ruling. In reaching its holding in Hicks, the Court expressed concerns about "trivializing" the principles of Younger and noted that those
principles were particularly appropriate "where the party to the federal
case may fully litigate his claim before the state court."" 2 In finding that
its own temporary restraining order was a proceeding of substance, the
district court not only trivialized Younger, but also sanctioned the race
to
48
the courthouse that the Supreme Court had previously condemned.
Perhaps in recognition of the fallacies in his finding that there was no
"pending" state prosecution, Judge Fitzpatrick alternatively ruled that
even if a state proceeding were pending, the principles of Younger were
inapplicable because of the presence of bad faith. " This finding, however, must also be subjected to closer scrutiny. In applying the Wilson
test of bad faith, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled that Westin's actions were constitutionally protected, that the state prosecuted Westin in retaliation for
that constitutionally protected conduct, and that it would not have prosecuted without the retaliatory motive.1 4' Assuming that Westin's words to
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

760 F. Supp. at 1565.
422 U.S. 332, 354 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 349.
See 760 F. Supp. at 1568 n.3.
Id. at 1565.
422 U.S. at 349.
Id. at 354 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
760 F. Supp. at 1572.
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McDaniel were protected under the First Amendment as free speech, the
subsequent finding of retaliation was improper and therefore the question
of whether the state would have prosecuted without a retaliatory motive
need not have been addressed.
The finding that District Attorney Briley's decision to prosecute was
based on retaliatory motives is not supported by the facts or supporting
case law. Judge Fitzpatrick based his ruling on Briley's failure to contact
Westin or conduct an investigation, and his conclusion that the grand
jury was reconvened solely to hear the charges against Westin.' This
ruling was supported by no probative evidence, however. A plaintiff alleging bad faith under Wilson must support his contentions by specific evidence, not conclusory allegations.1 47 In Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme
Court expressly overruled the district court's finding of bad faith on the
part of state officials because "the findings of the district court were
1 The Court placed particular emphasis on the
vague and conclusory.""'
fact that the prosecuting officials had relied on repeated judicial authorization for their conduct, and the district court made no attempt to impeach that authorization.'
Likewise, in Westin, Briley's decision to reconvene the grand jury was
completely within his authority and discretion as district attorney."60 So
long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused has
committed a criminal offense, the decision whether or not to prosecute,
and what charges to bring, rests entirely within the prosecutor's discretion."' Further, .the Supreme Court has recognized that
this decision to
'15
prosecute "is particularly ill-suited to judicial review."'
Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding,
threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives
and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All of
these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to
examine the decision to prosecute.'"
Thus, the district court's finding of bad faith, based solely on conclusory
and unsupported allegations, impermissibly interfered with the district
attorney's discretion and certainly chilled law enforcement in the
Ocmulgee Circuit.
146,
147.
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150.
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The Eleventh Circuit's affirmation without comment is somewhat perplexing because it is impossible to tell whether it was based on the district court's finding that there was no action pending in state court or the
alternative finding that the district attorney sought the indictment in bad
faith.'1 The standard of review to be applied with regard to injunctive
relief provides the most likely explanation. As the Supreme Court noted
in Doran.v. Salem Inn, Inc.: "while the standard to be applied by the
district court in deciding whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary
injunction is stringent, the standard of appellate review is simply whether
the issuance of the injunction, in the light of the applicable standard,
constituted an abuse of discretion."1' 5 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit simply
found that Judge Fitzpatrick did not abuse his discretion in providing
Westin with injunctive relief.
In conclusion, Westin v. McDaniel offers an insightful look at the pragmatism of the concerns of federalism and comity espoused in Younger
and companion cases. As evidenced by this Casenote, the decision of a
district judge to intervene in a state criminal proceeding or refrain from
intervening requires a careful analysis of case law and is not always an
uncomplicated task. The Supreme Court and various appellate decisions
have provided sufficient instruction, however. As noted by Judge Fitzpatrick, "a District Judge can, if he is careful, be guided through this legal
minefield and reach a decision that respects both the time honored doctrine of federalism and the equally time honored rights of a citizen whose
first amendment guarantees are in peril."'"
ROBERT
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